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NATIONAL HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY AND
NEW FEDERALISM
JAMES

G. HODGE, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

Protecting the privacy of identifiable health information has
been an important and pervasive concern of federal and state
legislators, courts, and executive agencies, private health care
providers, attorneys, academics, and individuals in the 1990's and
into the new millennium. There are numerous justifications for
greater individual privacy protections, specifically concerning
health data. Unlike some personal data, health information is
viewed by many individuals as highly-sensitive. Whether an individual has a communicable (e.g., HLV, syphilis, tuberculosis) or
other disease (e.g., diabetes, multiple sclerosis), condition (heart
or back ailment, mental illness), or genetic propensity (e.g.,
BRCA 1 breast cancer gene) is perhaps the most sensitive of personal information about a person. Furthermore, health records,
which are increasingly held in electronic form, contain large
amounts of other personal information which can be used to create a profile of an individual.'
In the United States, a society which strongly values individual autonomy and decision-making, protecting the privacy of
personally-identifiable health data is critical.' Insufficient protections of health care information can lead to unauthorized disclosures which may subject individuals to social stigma and
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Associate, Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health; Greenwall Fellow in
Bioethics and Health Policy sponsored by Johns Hopkins University and
Georgetown University (1997-99). I would like to thank Tyng Loh, J.D. Candidate 2001, Georgetown University Law Center, for her research assistance with

the article.
1.

This includes demographic information, such as age, sex, race, marital

status, children, and occupation; financial information, such as employment
status, income, and methods of payment; personal identifiers other than name,
including Social Security number, addresses, and phone numbers; and information about why treatment is sought, such as being the victim of a violent crime,
firearm injury, or the at-fault party in an auto accident. See Lawrence 0. Gostin,
Health CareInformation and the Protection of PersonalPrivacy:Ethical and Legal Considerations, 127 ANNALs INTERNAL MED. 683 (1997).
2. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
451, 453-54 (1995).
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discrimination by insurance companies, medical providers, and
employers.' As autonomous agents, people are ethically entitled
to some expectation of privacy in their personal affairs provided
the exercise of these interests does not harm others.4 Respecting
personal privacy requires that individuals maintain some degree
of control over their personal information.
However, in a modem national health information infrastructure that encourages widespread collection, storage, and disclosure of identifiable health information, there exist new
challenges to protecting health data privacy. Commercial entities-insurers, health product manufacturers, pharmaceutical
companies, information processors, and private marketers-and
public entities-government-supported researchers, public
health agencies-argue for access to health data for uses which
are both legitimate and unwarranted. Protecting health data
through legislation, administrative regulations, court decisions,
or health care practices or policies affords individuals some level
of privacy expectations in their personally-identifiable health
information.
Failing to protect the privacy of health information devalues
the information itself. Without adequate privacy protections,
health information may simply become a market and research
commodity. Like other personal data, health data could be
exchanged and used in a marketplace like any other commodity,
without regard to the individuals which they identify. The seriousness of such implications is not limited to violations of privacy
expectations arising from constitutional liberty interests or ethical principles of autonomy and justice. As I and others have
argued, protecting health information privacy by providing individuals some control over their health data would improve the
quality and reliability of health data because individuals would be
more likely to utilize health services without fear of unwarranted
disclosures. 5 This, in turn, would support communal uses of the
data for societal goods, such as public health and health
research, and diminish tort-based liabilities by reducing the
opportunities for medical malpractice or invasions of individual
privacy-ultimately, protection of health information privacy
3. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge,Jr., The "Names Debate": The
Casefor NationalHIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALBANY L. REv. 679, 724-27
(1998).
4. See Tom L. BEAucHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 126 (4th ed. 1994).

5.

See Janlori Goldman, Protecting Privacy To Improve Health Care, 17
47 (1998).

HEALTH Arr.
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would improve the quality of clinical care and medical products
in the marketplace. 6
Arguments for better health information privacy protections
have motivated significant legal reform, particularly at the state
level. States have traditionally recognized the long-standing bastion of privacy protection: the common law duty of confidentiality between a doctor and patient.7

Through the use of their

virtually limitless police powers, 8 states have also enacted numerous types of privacy laws and policies relating to health research
data, genetic information, public health data, and other subsets
of health information such as HIV information and cancer registry data. While many of these state laws apply only to government collections of data, some states have passed comprehensive
medical confidentiality laws which cover all types of health data.
Model state privacy acts have been developed concerning genetic
privacy, 9 public health information,' 0 and health information
generally."
The passage of numerous and varied state privacy laws and
regulations, however, has resulted in a patchwork system of protections.12 Glaring exceptions to protecting privacy remain."
6. See, e.g.,
James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Legal Issues Concerning Electronic
Health Information: Privacy, Quality, and Liability, 282 JAMA 1466, 1467 (1999).
7. See Lawrence 0. Gostin &James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercingthe Veil of Secrecy
in HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually TransmittedDiseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in PartnerNotification, 5 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 9, 42-44 (1998).
8. Police powers originate in the inherent need of government to restrain
the private actions of citizens to reduce the negative transgressions of such
actions on the private rights or property of another. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER G.
TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES 1-2 (1886). As one author theorizes, "police powers have their origin in
the law of necessity." W.P. PRENTICE, POLICE POWERS ARISING UNDER THE LAw
OF OVERRULING NECESSITY 4 (1894). Whenever individual actions or other ele-

ments constitute threats to the public welfare, governments should be able to
use their powers to reduce, deter, or enjoin the resulting harms to society. See
James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through Government:
An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'v 93, 100-01 (1997).

9. See GEORGE ANNAS ET AL., GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY
(1995).
10. See Model State Public Health Privacy Project (last modified Feb. 24,
1999) <http://www.critpath.org/msphpa/privacy.htm>
[hereinafter
MSPHPA]. The project was sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists
(CSTE), the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO), and
the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).
11.

See

NATIONAL CONFERENCE

OF COMMISSIONERS

ON UNIFORM

STATE

(1985).
12. See, e.g., Donna E. Shalala, Health Care Information and Privacy, 8
HEALTH 223, 227 (1998) ("[W]e rely on a patchwork of state laws. The fact is,
LAWS, UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE INFORMATION ACT
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State privacy laws differ extensively within and across jurisdictions
according to the type, source, and holder of the data. For example, HIV data may be protected more extensively than tuberculosis data. A health researcher may be held to stricter standards
than a practicing physician. And a state public health agency
may be required to meet stringent protections against disclosures
while a state1 worker's
compensation board may publicly disclose
4
similar data.

These varying and inconsistent laws have contributed to
pleas for federal health information privacy protections. Lacking
significant constitutional guarantees of health information privacy, Congress has introduced comprehensive health information privacy bills in both Houses in the past several years
pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) of 1996.15 Even though Congress has failed to
meet a self-imposed deadline pursuant to HIPAA to pass such
legislation covering electronic health data, the federal Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is preparing
administrative regulations for the same purpose,1 6 even though it
recommends the passage of federal privacy legislation.
Whether comprehensive federal health information privacy
protections emanate from new congressional privacy laws or
DHHS' administrative regulations, it seems certain that the federal government will provide some privacy protections for identifiable health information used in the private sector. It is
uncertain, however, whether and to what extent the federal government should or can effectually protect health information
privacy in an era of new federalism. Mirroring the trend toward
greater national privacy protections of health data over the past
twenty-five years is a marked political and judicial shift toward a
constitutional redistribution of federal and state powers. Federalism has become a powerful, substantive tool of constitutional
we have no national standards" to protect health information.); Geri Aston, Privacy of Records in Doubt, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 10, 1998, at 1, 27 ("There's an

inconsistent patchwork of state laws," quoting Kathleen Frawley).
13. See Shalala, supra note 12, at 224 ("[T] he way we protect the privacy of
our medical records right now is erratic at best-dangerous at worst.").
14.

See, e.g., James G. Hodge, Jr., The Intersection of FederalHealth Informa-

tion Privacy and State Administrative Law: The Protection of Individual Health Data
and Worker's Compensation, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 117 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Laddaga & Annette Roney Drachman, Health
Information Confidentiality, S.C. LAw., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 27.

16.

Department of Health and Human Services, Proposed Standards for

Privacy of Individually-Identifiable Health Information (visited Feb. 20, 2000)

<http://aspe.os.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pvcsumm.htm>

[hereinafter DHHS].
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law. 17 Principles of new federalism suggest not only that the
existing powers of the federal government should be limited, but
that prior federal responsibilities should increasingly be returned
to the states.
Whenever federal and state interests collide, federalismbased arguments arise. This includes the federal government's
attempt to regulate in the interest of protecting individual health
information privacy, traditionally an area of state concern. The
relationship between federalism and health information privacy
ultimately concerns the ability of government in the United
States to protect individual privacy, something which European
and other countries attempted in the 1990's. i " Principles of new
federalism challenge the assumption that the federal government may appropriately supply these protections and further
suggest that the existing patchwork of state protections must not
only be preserved, but may in fact be preferred.
Without questioning the ethical value of protecting individual health information privacy (which is virtually indisputable),
this Commentary analyzes the federalism implications underlying
issues of national health information privacy. Part I briefly
explores legal privacy protections of health information through
a review of existing federal and state constitutional, statutory,
and common law, and proposed federal health information privacy regulations. Part II explains new federalism through a discussion of its traditional notions and modern application in
Supreme Court and lower court jurisprudence, as well as other
political developments. Thereafter the theoretical and applied
relationships between new federalism and national health information privacy protections are analyzed. The primary consequence of new federalism is that while national, preemptive
legislation may be needed to fully protect health information privacy, it is unlikely to be accomplished politically or legally.

I.

LEGAL PROTECTION OF HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY

Though protecting health information privacy is increasingly important within a modern health information infrastructure which exchanges health data electronically, individual
17. "There is no going back of federalism," says Professor Susan Low
Bloch of Georgetown University Law Center. Joan Biskupic, Vexing Social Issues

Portend A Stirring Term for Supreme Court, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at A6.
"This is something Rehnquist and O'Connor have been working toward for
years and now that they have the votes they are not likely to stop" in their federalism jurisprudence. Id.
18.

See WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, PRIVACY AND HEALTH RESEARCH, A REPORT
HuvmAN SERVICES 44 (1997).

TO THE U.S. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
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privacy is not necessarily paramount. There are communal interests in the use and disclosure of individual health data. The collection, use, and disclosure of health data may benefit individuals
and society by enhancing patient choices, furthering clinical
advancements and medical research, and protecting public
health. These and other communal interests concerning identifiable health data arguably cannot be thwarted through restrictive
privacy provisions.1 9
Assuming a balance between individual privacy and communal interests can be attained, protecting the privacy of individually-identifiable health data can be satisfied in many ways.2 ° One
method of affording individuals some measure of privacy is to
provide rigorous legal safeguards of health information. These
legal safeguards may be expressed through federal or state constitutional protections of health information privacy, legislation,
or case law. As this Section demonstrates, however, existing legal
safeguards are inadequate, fragmented, and inconsistent. There
exist major gaps in legal protection of privacy and significant theoretical problems with its structure.
A.

ConstitutionalRight to Privacy

Scholars have debated the existence and extent of a constitutional right to informational privacy independent of the
Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures. 2 To some,judicial recognition of a constitutional right
to informational privacy is particularly important since the government is a primary collector and disseminator of health information. As a result, individuals need protection from the
19. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the
Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. (forthcoming 2000).
20. The law is merely one tool to improve individual privacy protections.
Internal privacy policies of health care providers, data processors, and other
private sector entities which acquire, use, and disclose identifiable health data
can greatly impact individual expectations of the privacy of their health information. The same can be said for voluntarily-executed policies of governmental holders of data, including public health agencies, researchers, universities
and academic centers, and other commissions or agencies. Adherence to ethical principles and human rights documents in support of the privacy of individual health data may also lead to greater privacy protections. Ultimately,
however, where government and the private sector fail to administer sufficient
privacy protections, the law may guide, if not require, such protections.
21. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension
Between Privacy and Disclosure in ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1991);
Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging
Unencumbered Constitutional Right to InformationalPrivacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv.
479 (1990); Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The ConstitutionalProtection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REv. 133 (1991).
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government itself, without resort to federal or state legislation.
An effective constitutional remedy is the surest method to shield
them from unauthorized government acquisition or disclosure of
personal information.
Unfortunately, the Constitution does not expressly provide a
right to informational privacy.2 2 A body of case law, however,
does suggest judicial recognition of a limited right to informational privacy as a liberty interest within the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. In Whalen v. Roe,23 the United
States Supreme Court examined whether the constitutional right
to privacy encompasses the collection, storage, and dissemination of health information in government data banks. In dicta,
the Court acknowledged "the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files."' 24 However, the Court failed to craft a constitutional remedy to meet
this threat. Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, simply recognized that "in some circumstances" the duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures "arguably has its roots in the Constitution."25 The Court found no violation in Whalen because the
state had adequate standards and procedures for protecting the
privacy of sensitive medical information. Rather, it suggested
deferentially that the supervision of public health and other
important government activities "require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is personal in character
and potentially embarrassing or harmful if
26
disclosed.

Most lower courts have read Whalen as affording a tightly circumscribed right to informational privacy, or have grounded the
right on wide-ranging state constitutional provisions.2 7 Courts
have employed a flexible test balancing the government invasion
of privacy against the strength of the government interest. 28 Pro22.
23.
U.S. 425
24.

See Gostin, supra note 2, at 495-98.
429 U.S. 589 (1977); see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433
(1977).
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535
(Fla. 1987). Since the 1970s, more than a dozen states have adopted constitutional amendments designed to protect a variety of privacy interests, including
limitations on access to personal information. See Gostin, supra note 2, at 498.
28. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d
Cir. 1980) (holding that National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
was endtled to receive medical records of private employees exposed to toxic
substance subject to their informed consent). The court enunciated five factors
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vided the government articulates a valid societal purpose and
employs reasonable security measures, courts have not interfered
with traditional governmental activities of information collection.
Unmistakably, government could enunciate a powerful societal
purpose in collection of health information such as public health
or law enforcement.
The right to informational privacy under the federal or state
constitutions is, of course, limited to state action. As long as the
federal or state government itself collects information or requires
other entities to collect it, state action will not be a central obstacle. However, collection and use of health data by private or
quasi-private health data organizations, health plans, researchers,
and insurers remains constitutionally unprotected.
B.

Common Law Protections

Most states recognize via common and statutory law the legal
duties of confidentiality of certain health care professionals (generally physicians) not to disclose health information concerning
patients. Such duties are not absolute. Disclosures without individual consent may lawfully be made to protect third parties from
identifiable harm, to report information for public health purposes as required by state law, or sometimes in cases of medical
emergency. Unwarranted disclosures, however, may subject
responsible parties to civil liability under several legal theories. 29
Although a traditional construct of privacy protections and a
forerunner of modern privacy theory, the duty of confidentiality
is antiquated. While it protects health data as part of the physician-patient relationship, modern data collection is based only in
small part on this relationship. Health records, moreover, contain a substantial amount of information gathered from numerous primary and secondary sources: laboratories, pharmacies,
schools, public health officials, researchers, insurers, and other
individuals and institutions. Patient health records are not
merely kept in the office of private physicians or health plans,
but also by government agencies, regional health database organizations, and information brokers. Databases maintained in
each of these settings are collected and transmitted electronito be balanced in determining the scope of the constitutional right to informational privacy: (1) the type of record and the information it contains, (2) the
potential for harm in any unauthorized disclosure, (3) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated, (4) the adequacy of
safeguards to prevent non-consensual disclosure, and (5) the degree of need
for access-i.e., a recognizable public interest. See id.
29. See, e.g., McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997);
Gostin, supra note 2, at 508-11; Gostin & Hodge, supra note 7, at 42-44.
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cally, reconfigured, and linked. The duty of confidentiality
which arises at the point of clinical care simply does not extend
to all these parties for all these purposes. Focusing legal protection of health information privacy on the therapeutic relationships between physicians and patients within a national health
information infrastructure is thus highly inadequate.
C. Legislative and Administrative Protections
1. Existing Federal and State Protections
Federal and state legislatures and executive agencies have
enacted and considered a growing number of statutes and regulations to protect privacy.3" The federal government has previously enacted several statutes and regulations to protect privacy
of health information. The Privacy Act of 1974 l requires federal
agencies to utilize fair information practices with regard to the
collection, use, or dissemination of systematized records, including health data. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of
196632 requires the federal government to disseminate various
information but exempts from disclosure several categories of
records which include personally-identifiable health information.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 protects
electronic communications during transmission or while in storage against unauthorized interceptions and improper uses,
although it likely does not protect interceptions of nonencrypted information over radio frequencies. Other federal
regulations require privacy protections in relation to the treatment of persons for drug or alcohol dependency in federallyfunded facilities" and the administration of human subject
research. 4
Most states have passed privacy statutes that mimic the federal Privacy Act3 5 and FOIA, 6 and thus apply only to state collections of data. A few states have enacted comprehensive medical
information privacy acts.3 7 These laws provide broad protections
for health information acquired, collected, used, or disclosed
within the state. States have also passed disease-specific privacy
laws which set forth stringent privacy and security protections for
30. See Gostin, supra note 2, at 499-508.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(3), (6) (1996).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994).
34. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-404 (1993).
35. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw §§ 91-99 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1995).
36. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-61-1 (1991).
37. See, e.g., CA.. CIv. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.02.005-70.02.904 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
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certain types of information, including medical information concerning one's HTV status"' or other sexually-transmitted disease,3 9 genetic information,40 information utilized in medical
research (such as state cancer registries), or public health
information.4 1
2.

Privacy Theory and A Model Proposal

Although the sophistication of these and other state proposals varies, they generally protect individual privacy pursuant to
what I call the "privacy formula," simply stated as follows:
HIP = (Unlimited DHI + IC) + (Narrow DHI - IC)
Where: HI = health information; P = privacy; D = disclosures; IC = informed consent.

This privacy theory, often coupled in modern laws with
security provisions and fair information practices, empowers individuals with some degree of control (through rights of access and
informed consent requirements 42 ) over the use and disclosure of
their identifiable health information. Disclosures are generally
prohibited unless a person has consented to the release of his
health information. 4 There are two caveats to this equation: (1)
where health information is truly non-identifiable-the information cannot be identified or linked to the person to which the
information relates-individual privacy interests are not impli38. See generally Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, MedicalPrivacy Issues in
the Age of AIDS: Legislative Options, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 155 (1990) (examining
state legislation dealing with HIV related problems in medical privacy laws).
39. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. &
MED. 461, 463-65 (1986).
40. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Genetic Privacy, 23 J.L., MED. & ETHICS
320-21 (1995).
41. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Public Health Information Infrastructure, 275 JAMA 1921 (1996).
42. This simplistic privacy formula upon which the doctor-patient duty of
confidentiality and many statutory proposals are based is arguably flawed.
According to the formula, virtually any disclosure is permissible provided an
individual consents. Where consent may be represented by little more than a
few lines of confusing text on an already burgeoning series of forms executed
by patients pursuant to the delivery of clinical care, individual informed consent may be devalued. Provided, however, that the patient has the capacity to
know what he or she has authorized, at least the individual has knowledge of
the potential disclosure and can act accordingly.
43. Legislation in Washington, which has passed a version of the Uniform
Health-Care Information Act, is demonstrative on this point. See WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 70.02.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996) (prohibiting disclosure of
health care information which is identifiable to a patient and directly related to
the patient's health care, see § 70.02.010(6), by a health care provider to any
person without the patient's written authorization).
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cated, and thus no limits should apply to the use or disclosure of
such information;4 4 and (2) exceptions to the general prohibition of disclosures of identifiable health data without informed
consent must be minimal, clearly stated, and acceptable deviations. Thus, for example, disclosures of individual communicable disease data pursuant to state reporting statutes to public
health authorities without specific informed consent are acceptable where needed to properly conduct public health surveillance.4 5 However, many privacy laws as proposed and enacted
contain exceptions for disclosures without informed consent,
some of which unjustifiably infringe on the individual privacy
interests which the laws are designed to protect.
Many state health information privacy laws struggle to balance competing interests underlying the acquisition, use, and
disclosure of identifiable health information between respecting
individual privacy and allowing warranted, communal uses of
health information. One model state privacy proposal, the
Model State Public Health Privacy Act4 6 (which concerns public
health information), attempts to reach this balance. Without discounting either the individual or communal interest, the Act
focuses its protections on the information itself. It affirmatively
allows people to access, inspect, and amend their health information;4" learn the ways in which it is used and disclosed;48 request
a record of disclosures; 49 and seek50 criminal or civil sanctions for
actions inconsistent with the Act.

Coextensively, the Act limits (to a degree) the ability of public health agencies to acquire, collect, and use identifiable health
information. Public health agencies may acquire, collect, and
use individually-identifiable health information only so long as
such information is needed to accomplish legitimate public
health purposes. 51 They must de-identify the information when44.
45.

See Hodge et al., supra note 6, at 1470,
See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 3, at 710-18; see also WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 70.02.050(2) (a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996) (allowing a health care provider to disclose identifiable health information without a patient's authorization to "federal, state, or local public health authorities, to the extent the health
care provider is required by law to report health care information; when
needed to determine compliance with state or federal licensure, certifications
or registration rules or laws; or when needed to protect the public health").
46. See MSPHPA, supra note 10.
47. See id. at §§ 6-101.
48. See id. at §§ 2-102, 4-109, 6-101.
49. See id. at § 4-109.
50. See id. at § 7-101.
51. A "public health purpose" is defined as:
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52
ever possible, expunge unnecessary information confidentially,
and maintain its accuracy.5 3 More importantly, the Act strictly
regulates disclosures of identifiable health information to persons or entities outside the agency. Consistent with the privacy
formula, it allows disclosures of health information to be made
for any purpose with advance, written informed consent.5 4 Disclosures without informed consent are limited to a few, narrow
exceptions. 5 Any disclosures of information must be as least
intrusive as possible to personal privacy and include commonsense language that describes basic privacy protections which the
subsequent holder must adhere. 6
Though existing federal and state privacy statutes and regulations are meaningful and serve valuable ends, they share several weaknesses: (1) like constitutional privacy protections, these
statutes generally apply only to government collections, uses, or
disclosures of health information, and thus often do not confer
protections to health information in the private sector; (2) they
generally fail to address the new challenges to individual privacy
arising from the automation of medical records; and (3) they collectively represent a patchwork effort to address privacy and
security concerns of individuals in specific health information or
information held by specific entities. These statutes do not comprehensively protect health information regardless of its subject
or holder. Some kinds of data are treated as super-confidential,
while other data are virtually unprotected. The weaknesses of
this myriad approach to health information privacy support the

[A] population-based activity or individual effort primarily aimed at
the prevention of injury, disease, or premature mortality, or the promotion of health in the community, including (a) assessing the health
needs and status of the community through public health surveillance
and epidemiological research, (b) developing public health policy,
and (c) responding to public health needs and emergencies.
Id. at § 1-103(9).
52. See id. at § 3-104.
53. See id. at § 6-103.
54. See id. at § 4-103.
55. Disclosures without informed consent by public health agencies or
secondary recipient may only be made: (1) directly to the individual; (2) to
appropriate federal agencies or authorities; (3) to health care personnel where
necessary in a medical emergency to protect the health or life of the person
who is the subject of the information; (4) pursuant to a court order sought
exclusively by public health agencies in light of a clear danger to an individual
or the public health; (5) to appropriate agencies performing health oversight
functions; or (6) to identify a deceased individual, determine the manner of
death, or provide information where the deceased is a prospective organ donor.
See id. at § 4-104.
56. See id. at § 4-103.
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need for comprehensive national health information privacy legislation or administrative regulations.
3.

Prospective Federal Protections

Prospective federal health information privacy legislation or
regulations are mandated by the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).7 HIPAA seeks to
reduce the administrative and financial burdens of health care by
standardizing the electronic transmission of health-related data.
In addition to security provisions which require health care providers to ensure the confidentiality of their electronic information, HIPAA required Congress to pass legislation by August 21,
1999, to set uniform standards for the transmission of health
insurance information, including recommendations for security
measures to protect private medical information."8 While several
health information privacy bills were considered by Congress,5 9
no action to date has been taken.
In the absence of congressional action, HIPAA requires that
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) draft
and implement administrative regulations by February 21, 2000.
DHHS is in the process of finalizing these regulations after
receiving thousands of comments from the public concerning
the initial draft. While DHHS would prefer that Congress pass
privacy legislation (consistent with advice from the National
Committee on Vital and Health Statistics),6" should Congress fail
to act, DHHS' recommendations reflect the eventual regulatory
framework for protecting health information privacy. The general purpose of DHHS' recommendations is to facilitate the
transmission of reasonably-identifiable electronic health information data among health payers and providers without compromising the privacy interests of individuals in the information. While
57.

Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of

42 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C.).
58. Id. at § 264; see alsoJane Harman, Topics for Our Times: New Health Care
Data-New Horizonsfor Public Health, 88 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 1019, 1021 (1998).
59. See, e.g., Health Care Personal Information Nondisclosure Act of
1999, S. 578, 106th Cong. (1999); Medical Information Privacy and Security
Act, S. 1368, 105th Cong. (1998); Health Care Personal Information Nondisclosure Act of 1998, S. 1921, 105th Cong. (1998); Medical Information Protection
Act of 1998, S. 2609, 105th Cong. (1998); Fair Information Practices Act of
1997, H.R. 52, 105th Cong. (1998); Medical Privacy in the Age of New Technologies Act of 1997, H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. (1998); Consumer Health and
Research Technology (CHART) Protection Act, H.R. 3900, 105th Cong.
(1998).
60. NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY RECOMMENDATIONS (1997).
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the recommendations do not cover all users and holders of identifiable health data, they present to date the broadest federal privacy protections of health information in the private sector.
DHHS' recommendations focus on five key principles: (1)
boundaries-health care information should be disclosed for
health purposes only (e.g., treatment, payment, or other health
care operations), with limited exceptions; (2) security-health
information should not be distributed unless the patient authorizes it or there is a clear legal basis for doing so and those who
receive such information must safeguard it; (3) consumer control-persons are entitled to know of the existence of and purposes for which their health information is being used and to
correct incorrect information in their health records; (4)
accountability-those who improperly hold, distribute, or use
health information should be criminally punished and held
civilly liable to harmed individuals, especially when such actions
are for monetary gain; and (5) public responsibility-privacy
interests of individuals must not override national priorities of
public health, medical research, health services research, quality
assurance, health care fraud and abuse, and law enforcement in
general.
An important component of these recommendations is
DHHS' intent, consistent with language in HIPAA itself and several congressional bills,6 1 to not preempt all state health information privacy laws. Rather, DHHS would likely provide a floor of
privacy regulations for national uniformity. Only those state laws
which conflict with or are less protective of federal privacy rights
would be preempted. State laws which are more protective of
privacy would survive. As such, establishing uniformity of health
information privacy protections, a basic goal underlying national
legislation or regulation, is significantly thwarted. Federal law
may establish a minimum of protections for the use of health
information in most contexts, but state law could raise the floor
of protections for certain data or holders. Thus, the development of homogenous privacy protection may be nullified
through floor preemption by the allowance of various existing
and future state laws which require additional protections for
some, but not all, data. Absent a federal privacy policy which
covers all users and holders of health data and completely
preempts existing state protections, privacy protections will continue to vary from state to state. Perhaps a national, broad preemptive approach to protecting health information privacy is
61.

See Lise Rybowski, Protecting the Confidentiality of Health Information,

NAT'L HEALTH POL'Y F., July 1998, at 1, 16-17 (1998).
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needed-and yet, for the reasons discussed below, it is politically
and legally problematic under principles of federalism.
II.

NEW FEDERALISM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO HEALTH
INFORMATION PRIVACY

Several observations stem from the foregoing discussion of
legal protections of health information privacy. First, traditionally, protecting the privacy of health data has largely been the
responsibility of state governments. State governments are
uniquely positioned through the use of their broad police powers to regulate health information privacy to the degree and
manner deemed necessary. Second, while state experimentation
is potentially valuable, collectively such variability has resulted in
an unfair and incomplete system of health information privacy
protections. Existing state laws represent a patchwork approach
which is inconsistent, at times weak, and antiquated. Third, as a
result, Congress and DHHS have responded with proposals for
national privacy protections. These proposals, however, fail to
make uniform privacy protections where floor preemption is utilized. Individuals may continue to lack protection of certain
health data across jurisdictions, raising equitable issues of
fairness.
From these three observations, a fourth naturally follows.
Intersecting the need for better privacy protections are significant federal and state government interests. The federal government has a significant national interest in uniformly protecting
the privacy of health information. State governments have traditional interests in protecting the privacy of health data within
their jurisdictions. These competing interests raise an interesting intergovernmental debate: which government, state or federal, is responsible for protecting privacy? Can they share
responsibility, and if so, to what degree? These questions are fundamentally issues of federalism. Their resolution requires an
assessment and application of the principles of federalism which
are explained in the sections below.
A.

Principles of Federalism

1. A Principle of Law and Design
It has been said that the Constitution "acts as both a fountain and a levee."6 2 It "controls the flow of governmental power
between state and federal governments . . ., and subsequently
62. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law, inJUDITH AREEN ET AL.,
SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 520 (2d ed. 1996).

LAW,
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curbs that power to protect individual freedoms."6 As the dark,
bolded line in the Figure below illustrates, if the Constitution is a
fountain from which powers flow to the federal government and
the states,6 4 the principle of federalism represents the partition
in the pool from which the states' fountain draws.

Federalism
State Police Powers

U.S
Cositution

Federal Powers

Federalism divides and balances the available pool of legislative
power into two segments of government, national and state.6 5 It
is as much a principle of law as it is a principle of governmental
design: federalism historically represents
the fundamental frame66
work of American government.
63. Id.
64. It is uncertain that the Framers or Supreme Court conceived the Constitution as a source of power to the states since the states simply retained their
powers not otherwise delegated to the federal Congress nor prohibited by the
Constitution. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 87 (1824) ("[T]he constitution
gives nothing to the States or the people. Their rights existed before it was
formed; and are derived from the nature of sovereignty and the principles of
freedom.").
65. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
66. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869) ("The Constitution, in all
its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States."); A REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM OF THE DOMESTIC
POLICY COUNCIL, THE STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA 2 (1986) [hereinafter
FEDERALISM REPORT] ("federalism is a constitutionally based, structural theory of
government designed to ensure political freedom").
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In practice, federalism distinguishes between the powers
among the levels of American governments.6 7 The federal government has those limited powers granted pursuant to the Constitution, including the power to enact laws in areas which the
federal government has jurisdiction. To preserve the powers of
the federal government from intrusion by the states, the
Supremacy Clause 6 8 provides that federal laws and regulations
override conflicting state laws under the doctrine of preemption.
State law is preempted by federal constitutional or statutory law
either by express provision,6 9 by a conflict between federal and
state law, 7 ° or by implication where "Congress so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference
7
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.'" 1
Likewise, with the passage of the Tenth Amendment, states
retained their dominant place in American government by
reserving sovereign power over "all the objects, which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State." 72 These powers, collectively known as
police powers, give states broad jurisdiction to regulate matters
affecting the health, safety, and general welfare of the public,73
including health information privacy.
While the distinction between federal and state powers is a
consequence of federalism, it is not always predictable in application. Federalism does not represent a bright line between state

67. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court and Federalism,WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2000,
at A26 ("The proper question [of federalism] is whether . . . policy issues

[should] be addressed by the appropriate level of government, rather than
which level is likely to deliver a particular favored outcome.").
68. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.").
69. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
70. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 654, 654-55 (1995); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725 (1981).
71. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
(quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230); see alsoJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
527 (1977).
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted in Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
73. See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3-4 (1904);James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism
and Public Health Law, 12J.L. & HEALTH 309, 318-20 (1998).
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and federal powers."4 "The meaning of federalism, after all, has
been the primary political issue for most of American history""7
even though the distribution of powers among governments was
originally meant to be relatively clear.7 6 In spite of the Framers'
intent to clarify inter-governmental powers, the powers of federal
and state governments approach one another on a regular basis.
It is precisely at the point when federal and state powers collide
that federalism takes on many shades and "almost imperceptible
gradations."7 7
Federalism issues can be classified into two broad categories.
The first category is state intrusions into the federal sphere. These
intrusions include instances where states intrude on the constitutional authority of the federal government by, for example,
enacting laws which interfere with Congress' regulation of interstate commerce,7 8 or fail to recognize federal supremacy or
authority by, say, attempting to impose taxes on federal goods.7 9
Such examples proliferate during the early years of the republic
as states tested the limits of their sovereign powers.
The second category is federal intrusions into traditionalstate
duties. Originally federal exercises which interfered with traditional state powers were virtually inconceivable in light of the
considerable weight of state police powers.8" In theory, federal
74. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) ("The task of
ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and state power has given
rise to many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases.").
75. R. Shep Melnick, Statutory Reconstruction: The Politics of Eskridge's Interpretation,84 GEO. LJ. 91, 120 (1995).
76. The essence of federalism is that federal and state governments
"should be limited to [their] own sphere and, within that sphere, should be
independent of the other." RUTH LOCKE ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME COURT AND
STATE POLICE POWER: A STUDY IN FEDERALISM 5 (1957) (citing KC. WHRAuE,
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1951)); see alsoYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)
("[Federalism involves] a proper respect for state functions . . . and . . . the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.").
77. 16 Am.JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 277 (1979); Alan R. Arkin, Inconsistencies in Modern FederalismJurisprudence,70 TUL. L. REv. 1569 (1996).
78. See, e.g., South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303
U.S. 177 (1938) (finding constitutional a South Carolina law that prohibited
trucks over 90 inches wide or weighing over 20,000 gross pounds on state highways despite infringement on interstate commerce).
79. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (invalidating the attempt
by Maryland to tax the issuance of bank notes by the newly created national
bank).
80. States were considered essential to the functioning of government
because they retained the majority of powers. See FEDERALISM REPORT, supra
note 66, at 10. So powerful were the states under the original balance of power
among the national and state governments that Alexander Hamilton com-
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legislation which touched areas traditionally left to the states was
beyond Congress' jurisdiction, and therefore did not reign
supreme over state law. However, the expansion of the federal
government during the New Deal required a relaxation of such
traditional notions of federalism.8" As explained below, arguments stemming from federal intrusion over states typify, though
not exclusively, modern federalism debates.
2.

New Federalism

What has been coined "new federalism '8 2 is a principle of
political change8 3 spurred by mini-revolutions among the states
and judicial activism that is enveloped in the idea that the
existing powers of the federal government should be limited and
returned to the states.8 4 Increasingly, federalism has been the
focal point of political and judicial issues. Although several state
governors failed in their 1994 effort to organize a "Conference of
States" to draft federal constitutional amendments in support of
greater state rights,8 5 Congress has recently introduced several
bills which would require it to consider federalism issues prior to
mented "there is greater probability of encroachments by the [states] upon the
federal [government] than by the federal [government] upon the [states]." Id.
at 9 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton)). See also New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (emphasis added):
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have
been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the
Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have
believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would
assume such responsibilities.
81. See, e.g., Daniel S. Herzfeld, Comment, Accountability and the Nondelegation of Unfunded Mandates: A Public Choice Analysis of the Supreme Court's Tenth
Amendment FederalismJurisprudence,7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 419 (1999).
82. The term "new federalism" may have first been used by Donald E.
Wilkes, Jr. in his article, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
83. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, House GOP's Impact: Transformingan Institution,
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at A4 (chronicling the failures of former House

of Representatives Speaker, Newt Gingrich, Eilperin comments that "while
Gingrich had once hoped to lead the country from the speaker's chair, some of
the changes he set in motion may well diminish the legislative branch's power
in the years to come by transferring powers to state and local governments").
84. See Richard C. Reuben, The New Federalism,A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 7677 (arguing the resurgence of federalism is partially the result of increased
political efforts of the states to move toward greater autonomy from the federal
government and the effects of such efforts on the political processes on Capitol
Hill).
85. See William Claiborne, Supreme Court Rulings Fuel Fervor of Federalists,
WASHINGTON POST, June 28, 1999, at A2.
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the passage of legislation.8 6 In August, 1999, President Clinton
signed the second draft of his executive order concerning federalism. The initial draft of the order was roundly rejected by state
and local government associations for its failure to appropriately
reflect new federalism principles.8 7 The revised order disfavors
federal preemptive laws or policies, requires executive officials to
defer to states whenever possible in setting national standards,
and features an enforcement mechanism against implementation of federal
executive policies that lack a federalism "impact
88
statement.
The United States Supreme Court has "played a major
role" 89 in setting "a new frontier of federalism."9" Beginning
with the Court's 1976 decision in National League of Cities v.
Usury,a new federalism cases have resulted in the Court's (1)
adoption of a super-strong rule against federal invasion of "core
state functions; '"92 (2) presumption against application of federal
statutes to state and local political processes;93 (3) disdain for
federal action that "commandeers" state governments into the
service of federal regulatory purposes; 94 (4) rejection of federal
86. See Ron Eckstein, Federalism Bills Unify Usual Foes, LEGAL TIM-S, Oct.
18, 1999, at 1.
87. See David S. Broder, Federalism's New Framework, WASHINGTON POST,
Aug. 5, 1999, at A21.
88. Id.
89. David S. Broder, Editorial-Challengefor the States, WASHINGTON POST,
Aug. 10, 1999, at A19.
90. William Claiborne, Supreme Court Rulings Fuel Fervor of Federalists,
WASHINGTON POST, June 28, 1999, at A2.
91. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (finding Congress lacked the jurisdictional
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the wages and hours of public
employees engaged in "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions" through the Fair Labor Standards Act), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also Robert H. Freilich &
David G. Richardson, Returning to a General Theory of Federalism:Framing a New
Tenth Amendment United States Supreme Court Case, 23 URnB. LAw. 215 (1994).
92. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding that pursuant
to a challenge based on the decision of a local zoning authority to deny a
church a building permit, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as
beyond Congress authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked the commerce power under U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 to enact the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, making criminal the knowing possession of a gun by a student
while at school).
93. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373
(1991).
94. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (declaring unconstitutional the federal requirement under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act that state chief law enforcement officers temporarily conduct background
checks on prospective handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505
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claims brought by private parties against states9 5 for overtime
wages,9 6 patent infringements,"' engaging in false advertising,9 8
and to resolve gambling disputes;9 9 and (5) adoption of the
"plain statement rule" that Congress must "mak[e] its intention
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute"'10 0 that state
law is preempted where such may alter the balance of federalism. 0 1 Most recently, the Court opined that state employees cannot sue states for violations of the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act because Congress lacked the power, consistent
with the Eleventh Amendment,10 2 to subject states to such
suits. 1°
The majority of these cases concern the second classification
of federalism issues-when does federal intrusion into predominantly state matters exceed the limits of federal powers? However, new cases before the Court evince atypical federalism
disputes where states and private parties have aggressively begun
to challenge issues under the federal domain. For example, in
its first term of this century, the Court decided that states cannot
impose environmental regulations on oil tankers that are more
U.S. 144 (1992) ("take tide" incentive provisions of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 are constitutionally invalidated
where they requires states to (1) either regulate pursuant to Congress' directions or (2) take title
to and possession of the radioactive waste generated instate or become liable to waste generators for all damages from the state's failure to take the wastes. Both of these "options" are unconstitutional based on
principles of federalism because Congress cannot require states to implement
legislation according to federal directives nor "commandeer" states into the service of federal regulatory purposes); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (finding that Congress may not
commandeer the state legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program).
95. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justices, 5-4, Strengthen State Rights, WASHINGTON
POST, June 24, 1999, at Al.

96.

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).

97. See Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd.v. College Say.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
98. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
99. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
100. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
101. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
102. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to. any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
103. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000); see also
Joan Biskupic, Court Curbs Suits By State Workers, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 12,
2000, at All; Linda Greenhouse, Age Bias Case in Supreme Court Opens a New
Round of Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A25.
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strict than those provided by federal law.' °4 The Court will soon
rule on whether private parties can bring state personal injury
claims against automobile manufacturers who failed to install
airbags in the late 1980s despite preemptive federal legislation
and regulations which allowed manufacturers to install either
automatic seatbelts or airbags; °5 and whether states can enforce
state laws which prohibit state purchasing agreements with companies doing business in objectionable international locales
(based on their authoritarian governments, human rights issues,
or other criteria), in possible contravention of the federal constitutional power to regulate foreign affairs. 10 6
These cases are reminiscent of early federalism disputes
where states intruded upon federal power.'0 7 They reflect the
idea that the constitutional principle of federalism is more than a
single-edge sword against federal centralism. Federalism cuts
both ways. Curtailing the power of the federal government (the
impetus for new federalism) simultaneously empowers the states.
As Justice O'Connor opined in New York v. United States,'" 8 the
authority of Congress under the Constitution may be examined
in two ways:
In some cases the Court has inquired whether an Act of
Congress is authorized by one of the powers delegated to
Congress in Article I of the Constitution. In other cases
the Court has sought to determine whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by
the Tenth Amendment. In a case like this one, involving
the division of authority between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other.
If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the
Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of
that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power
the Constitution has not conferred on
10 9
Congress.

104. See United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000).
105. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 33 (1999).
106. See Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999); see alsoJoan Biskupic, High Court to
Review Mass. Law on Burma, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 30, 1999, at A4; Linda

Greenhouse, Justices to Decide Foreign Policy Question in Massachusetts Boycott of
Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at A20.
107. See supra Pt. I1(A)(1).
108. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
109. Id. at 155-56 (citations omitted); but see Martin H. Redish, Doing It
with Mirrors: New York v. United States and Constitutional Limitations on Federal
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Thus not only can states challenge federal acts which impede on
their traditional powers, they can also attempt to intrude on federal authority. This is a consequence of a revived federalism
which has become a powerful, substantive tool of constitutional
law. 110
B.

The Intersection of New Federalism and Health
Information Privacy

As mentioned above, 1 ' an attempt by Congress or DHHS to
impose national health information privacy standards involves a
collision of inter-governmental interests, thus implicating federalism. The federal government's interest in nationalizing privacy
protections naturally overlaps the states' interests in setting their
own privacy standards. Can these interests be accomplished
coextensively? Theoretically perhaps, but realistically no. As
argued below, principles of federalism suggest that (1) while the
federal government may have the power to regulate health information privacy, it cannot totally preempt state health information privacy laws to homogenize protections; and (2) because
states have traditionally regulated health information privacy, the
federal government's ability to regulate in this area is limited.
The federal government cannot compel states to legislate in the
interests of national uniformity and may not subject states to liability for failure to adhere to federal laws. Furthermore, states
serve a valued role in protecting health information privacy
which federalism suggests cannot be discounted.
1. Congressional Powers
Though regulating health information privacy at the
national and state levels implicates federalism concerns, the issue
is not whether Congress or DHHS (with congressional authority)
has the constitutional power to enact national health information privacy standards. Congress has ample authority in this area.
Consistent with principles of federalism, Congress can utilize its
power to regulate interstate commerce"12 to nationalize privacy
protections of health data exchanged (inter- or intra-state) by
Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593, 594 (1994) (stating thatJustice O'Connor's premise is "totally false; significant practical conse-

quences flow from a reviewing court's choices between these two interpretive
methodologies").
110. See Ronald J. Bacigal, The Federalism Pendulum, 98 W. VA. L. REV.771,
772 (1996) ("Federalism [identifies] the rules of the game, under which the
process of decision-making and exercise of government power will proceed.").
111. See supra Pt. Il(A).
112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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commercial entities (e.g., health care providers, data processors,
health insurers). It can offer states a choice pursuant to the
Commerce Clause between regulating activity according to federal standards, or having state law preempted by federal regulation,"' in the spirit of "cooperative federalism."1 1 4 Federal laws
like the Americans with Disabilities Act' 5 or the Family and Medical Leave Act' 16 feature such provisions.
The Court's recent decision, Reno v. Condon,'1 7 clarifies the
commerce powers of Congress to regulate in the interest of protecting individual privacy. The Court held that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 1' 8 which restricts the
disclosure of personally-identifiable information1 1 9 held by state
motor vehicle departments (DMVs), 12 ° is a proper exercise of
113. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 764-65 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
114. Id. (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2657 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
117. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
119. "Personal information" means information "that identifies an individual, including an individual's photograph, social security number, driver
identification number, name, address (but not the five-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information," but does not include
"information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status." 18
U.S.C. § 2725(3).
120. The DPPA protects individual privacy consistent with the "privacy
formula." See supra Pt. I(C)(2). The Act restricts states' ability to disclose a
driver's personal information without the driver's consent by generally prohibiting state DMVs from "knowingly disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to
any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the
department in connection with a motor vehicle record" without individual consent. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). Pursuant to a recent amendment to the DPPA, states
may not imply consent from a driver's failure to take advantage of a stateafforded opportunity to block disclosure. Instead, states must obtain a driver's
consent to disclose the driver's personal information. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(d).
Consistent with the second caveat of the "privacy formula," the DPPA's prohibition of disclosures without consent is subject to a number of statutory
exceptions, including disclosures for (A) use in connection with matters of
motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, emissions, product alterations, recalls,
advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor
vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non-owner records by motor vehicle
manufacturers to carry out federal programs, see 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (2); (B)
use "by any government agency" or by "any private person or entity acting on
behalf of a Federal, State or local agency in carrying out its functions," 18
U.S.C. § 2721 (b) (1); (C) any state-authorized purpose relating to the operation
of a motor vehicle or public safety, see 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (b)(14); (D) use by a
business to verify the accuracy of personal information, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721(b) (3); (E) court, agency, or self-regulatory body proceedings, see 18
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Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce. 1 2' Congress passed the DPPA in 1994 in response to the well-publicized
case of an actress murdered by a stalker who obtained her
address through California motor vehicle records. 122 The Court
held that personally-identifiable information contained within
motor vehicle records is a "thin[g] in interstate
commerce," and
123
is thus appropriate for federal regulation.
The Court was unpersuaded by arguments raised by several
states 124 and spearheaded by the South Carolina Attorney General that the DPPA violated principles of federalism. Reversing
two lower court decisions, 125 the Court found that the DPPA
does not require (1) states in their sovereign capacity to regulate
their own citizens,' 26 but rather regulates states as "owners of
databases"; (2) state legislatures to enact any laws or regulations;
and (3) state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals. As a result, the DPPA does
not impede on the sovereign27authority of states in violation of
the principles of federalism.'
While Reno suggests Congress may utilize its commerce
power to regulate health information, Congress also has other
powers at its disposal. It can encourage uniform state regulation
U.S.C. § 2721 (b) (4); (F) research purposes provided the information is not further disclosed or used to contact the individuals to whom the data pertain, see
18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(5); (G) use by automobile insurers, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721 (b) (6); (H) notifying vehicle owners that their vehicle has been towed or
impounded, see 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (b) (7); (I) use by licensed private investigative
agencies or security services, see 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (8); and (J) private toll
transportation services, see 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (b) (10).
121. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671.
122. SeeJoan Biskupic, Court Backs Privacy ForData on Drivers, WASHINTON
POST, Jan. 13, 2000, at Al.
123. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995):
The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold
is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others
engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized
solicitations. The information is also used in the stream of interstate
commerce by various public and private entities for matters related to
interstate motoring. Because drivers' information is, in this context,
an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of
business is sufficient to support congressional regulation.
124. For a history of lower court decisions leading up to the Supreme
Court's review, see Thomas H. Odom & Gregory S. Feder, Challengingthe Federal
Driver's Privacy ProtectionAct: The Next Step in Developing a Jurisprudenceof Processoriented Federalism Under the Tenth Amendment, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 71 (1998).
125. See Reno v. Condon, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998); Condon v. Reno,
972 F. Supp. 977 (D. S.C. 1997).
126. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 668.
127. See id. at 668.
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or offer incentives to influence policy choices made by states.
For example, pursuant to its power to tax and spend,12 8 Congress
may attach conditions on a state's receipt of federal funds. So
long as Congress' conditions bear some relationship to the purpose of federal spending, 129 it can require states to adopt and
administer health information privacy standards.
2.

The Question of Preemption

Even if Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate,
can it politically implement comprehensive health information
privacy standards? This is a central federalism question. As discussed above, 130 national, broadly preemptive standards are
needed to fully and uniformly protect health information privacy. Congress has the power to totally preempt all state health
information privacy laws to accomplish this goal. However, principles of federalism require Congress to be explicitly clear in its
intent to preempt state law in core areas traditionally under state
control, including state health information privacy laws. The
clarity of federal language needed to totally preempt state laws in
this capacity acts as a "red flag," warning federal legislators, state
governments, and other interested parties of the potential for
federal control over a traditional, state-based matter. Unless the
need for federal control is overwhelming, the proposed legislation is altered by the response of states and their congressional
representatives.
The reality of federalism as a political construct is readily
seen in existing federal health information policy which suggests
that federal law should set minimum standards for protecting
health information privacy, allowing states to create higher standards. Furthermore, congressional and DHHS' proposals specifically exempt uses and disclosures of identifiable health
information for public health purposes. This broad exemption,
which greatly relies on what constitutes "public health" in a given
state, is reflective of federalism where regulating public health
128. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
129. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (upholding
federal law allowing Secretary of Transportation to withhold federal highway
funds from states failing to prohibit persons under twenty-one years old from
purchasing alcohol). The Court declared that exercises of the conditional
spending powers are valid subject to several restrictions: (1) they must be in
pursuit of the general welfare in the discretion of Congress; (2) Congress must
condition federal funds unambiguously; (3) the conditions must be reasonably
related to the particular federal program or national interest; and (4) they must
not otherwise be coercive or in violation of other constitutional provisions. See

id.
130.

See supra I(C)(3).
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has always been13 1a core state function consistent with broad state
police powers.

3.

State Liabilities

Assume that health information privacy is sufficiently compelling to rally political support for broadly preemptive federal
legislation setting uniform standards for protecting individual
privacy interests. Principles of federalism suggest not only that
this is politically difficult to accomplish, but also that it may be an
inherently flawed strategy. Administering such protections
requires enforcement mechanisms which, like the protections
themselves, must be uniformly applied. A primary enforcement
mechanism is the allowance of civil sanctions for breaches of privacy principles, including suits by citizens against states. Like the
federal government, states collect, use, and disclose a large
amount of health data about individuals. Comprehensive
national privacy restrictions would view states as any other actor
to the extent they hold identifiable health data.13 2 As a result,
violations of federal law by states would likely subject states to
civil sanctions brought by private citizens in federal or state
courts. As the Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe of Floridav.
tloridal3 and several subsequent opinions,"' the Eleventh
Amendment of the Federal Constitution significantly limits Congress' ability to subject sovereign states to citizen suits.
Congress circumvented this issue in passing the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA). The Act makes it unlawful for any
"person" knowingly to obtain or disclose any record for a use that
is not permitted under its provisions, or to make a false representation in order to obtain personal information from a motor
vehicle record.1 3 5 Violators may be subject to criminal fines13 6
131. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public'sHealth: A
Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 59, 77-88
(1999).
132. Pursuant to its commerce power, Congress can apply uniform provisions concerning information privacy to state and private actors. See Reno v.
Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2000):
[W]e need not address ... whether general applicability is a constitutional requirement for federal regulation of the States because the
DPPA is generally applicable. The DPPA regulates the universe of
entities that participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle
information-the States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate commerce and private resellers or redisclosers of that information in commerce.
133. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
134. See supra notes 96-98.

135.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2722(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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and civil liability through actions brought by aggrieved individuals."3 7 The DPPA, however, specifically defines "person" to
exclude states and state agencies,13 8 thus avoiding the issue of
subjecting sovereign states to civil liability at the hands of their
own citizens. 139 Congress, however, may be loathe to withhold
civil liability sanctions against states by private citizens pursuant
to breaches arising under health information privacy legislation
where states control a great deal of health data.
4.

The Role of States

A federal policy which incorporates broad, preemptive regulations discounts the role of states in regulating health information privacy. The federal government may share jurisdiction in
the field, but it may not obliterate the states' role without violating federalism principles on two grounds. First, the federal government cannot easily take over an area of governmental
responsibility traditionally reserved to the states (like protecting
the privacy of health data). This is a core precept of new federalism. Second, it is not in the interests of the federal government
to eliminate state responsibilities in this regard. The federal government is not well-positioned to completely administer health
information privacy regulations. It needs state government
assistance.
For Congress to guarantee state participation and sharing of
responsibility for protecting privacy, it must somehow utilize state
resources (e.g., administrative agencies, courts, law enforcement). Congress' ability to require state assistance and adherence to federal privacy policy, however, is complicated. As the
Court clarified in Printz v. United States, 4 ' "[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States' officers . . . to

administer or enforce a federal regulatory program."14' 1 Thus,
Congress cannot compel states to pass state legislation in accordance with national privacy objectives (although it may encourage
136. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723(a), 2725(2).
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 2724.
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 2725(2).
139. States which maintain a "policy or practice of substantial noncompliance" with the DPPA, however, may be subject to civil penalties imposed by the
United States Attorney General of not more than $5,000 per day of substantial
noncompliance. 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b). Neither the parties nor the Court in
Reno found any federalism objection to the imposition of a standard fine by the
federal government against states which fail to comply with federal law.
140. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
141. Id. at 935.
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the passage of state legislation through spending incentives) or
require state officials to administer federal privacy regulations
(although it may require adherence to privacy laws or administer
such regulations directly).
In this regard, federalism constrains the federal government
in its attempt to nationalize health information privacy standards
through legislation or regulations. Simultaneously, the duties of
states to protect individual privacy are preserved. This consequence of federalism is both positive and negative. From the
negative view, federalism stands in the way of effective, efficient,
and uniform health information privacy protections administered by a central entity (e.g., a federal data protection
board).142 Failing to implement a national standard complicates
the exchange of data, allows for inconsistent disclosures of data,
may leave some individual's health data unprotected depending
on state law, and is otherwise inconsistent with the
development
14 3
of a national health information infrastructure.
From the positive view, federalism preserves the role of
more responsive state and local governments to address and
administer privacy protections consistent with their citizens'
needs. While national, uniform protections of individual privacy
are desired within the modern health information infrastructure,
variable protections are also valuable. A single, comprehensive
federal privacy policy cannot possibly protect some health data to
the degree needed.'4 For example, citizens in a state with a
higher incidence of HIV/AIDS may seek to protect such data
more significantly than another state with a relatively small HIV/
AIDS population. Variability among health information privacy
protections in this example may be needed to protect one state's
HIV/AIDS population from certain types of stigma or discrimination which these citizens have experienced. Such variability,
however, cannot flow from a single, federal privacy policy. This,
of course, is one of the primary strengths of uniform federal protections: that variability will largely be eliminated thus equalizing
individual protections across states.14 5
The conundrum of federalism is that while many may want a
national, uniform system of health information privacy protections, ultimately this may not easily be accomplished through
142.

See Hodge et al., supra note 6, at 1470.
See Gostin, supra note 2, at 516-17.
144. As South Carolina State Attorney General Charles Condon suggested following the Supreme Court's decision in Reno, "[a] one size-fits-none
attempt by the federal government to protect privacy will not work." Biskupic,
supra note 122, at Al.
145. See Gostin, supra note 2, at 517.
143.
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national law. This seems perplexing to observers who believe the
federal government has the constitutional power to homogenize
protections, but fail to understand that the federal government's
authority is limited by the inherent structure of our federalist system. Ultimately, federalism requirements do not prohibit the
implementation of national, uniform protections. These protections may derive, for example, from uniform state laws. 14 6 The
end result-national health information privacy protectionsmay largely be the same, although the manner in which they are
provided must flow from our federalist system of government.
CONCLUSION

The inherent societal and individual goods underlying the
protection of the privacy of health data are incontrovertible.
Protecting privacy is ethically sustainable and necessary to ensure
quality health data within a national health information infrastructure and accomplish communal goals such as health
research and public health. Legal protections at the national
government level may ensure a single, uniform privacy standard.
As this Commentary illustrates, however, regulating health information privacy through national legislation or administrative regulations raises core federalism concerns. While there is support
for the nationalization of privacy protections, accomplishing this
through federal law is complicated. State and local governments
have always had a role in protecting the privacy of individual
health data which principles of federalism acknowledge. Ultimately, federalism requires that the role of states be respected
which, in turn, limits the ability of the federal government to
implement broadly preemptive national privacy protections.
This end result of federalism is not preferred where it allows for
continued variability of health protections stemming from the
myriad of state privacy laws. Yet, allowing state experimentation
is an admirable, if not inconvenient, trait of a federalist system of
government. Perhaps it is a consequence of federalism which we
should adhere.

146. Many state laws are sufficiently uniform as to create a virtually
equivalent system of laws in these areas (e.g., workers compensation, commercial laws). At least one proposal for uniform state health information privacy
law, the Uniform Health Care Information Act of 1985, however, was not wellreceived by states. See id. at 516.

